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Abs t ract:   I nst r um ent al  eff i ciency wa g e   m odel s predict  an i nverse r elati onshi p bet w een wa g e s   and supervi sion 
wi t h t hi s relati onshi p becom i ng m ore pronounced am ongst  fi r ms  t hat  participat e in som e form o f  em ployee 
shari ng.   To  be  sure,  our  t heoreti cal  exposi t i on  predicts t hat   an  i ncrease  i n  t ot al  r em unerati on  wi l l   eli cit   a  l arger  cut 
i n opt i ma l  m oni t ori ng i n ‘shari ng’ rather than ‘non shari ng’ fi r ms .  In t hi s paper,  w e expl ore these pr edicti ons
em pir i call y usi ng t he Bri t i sh 1998  W orkpl ace Em ployee R elati ons Survey.  Ou r  result s confi r m a n  i nverse 
relati onshi p  bet w een supervi sion  and  pay  but   t he  t rade-off   i s onl y  hei ght ened by  t he  presence of  perf orm ance 
r elated pay and em pl oyee share ow nership schem es.  We  a l so fi nd t hat  em ployee share ow nership and 
perf orm ance r elated pay are r elati vel y mo r e successful   i n all eviati ng t he need t o m oni t or,   wi t h t he r ate of  profi t  
shari ng  i m pacti ng  i nsi gni f i cantl y  on  t he  l evel  supervi sion.
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I. Introduct i on
Ef f i ciency w age theory suggest s that  em ployers can imp r ove t he product i vi t y or qual i t y of thei r  
wo r kforce by payi ng wa g e s   i n excess of  t he opport uni t y cost  of  l abour.   Ther e are t wo   school s of 
t hought   as t o how  t hese wa g e   prem ia operate.  The  ‘ i nst r um ent ali st’   vi ew  i s t hat   em ployees choose 
how  hard t o wo r k by equat i ng t he ma r gi nal   costs and benefi t s of  shir ki ng.   Wa g e   prem ia are t hus 
carr ot s t hat   em ployers use,   along  wi t h  t he  sti ck of  di sm issal,   t o  encourage an opt i ma l   suppl y  of  wo r k 
eff ort   [ Shapi r o  and  St i gl i t z ( 1984),   Bowl es ( 1985)] .   The  ‘ sociol ogi cal’   approach,  i n  cont r ast,   argues 
t hat   t he prem ia r epresent  a ‘ gi f t ’   by t he f i r m  t hat   appeals t o norms   of  l oyal t y and mu t ual   obl i gat i on 
on t he part   of  i t s wo r kforce [ Ak e r l of  ( 1982)] .   A ccordi ng t o t hi s   vi ew  eff i ciency wa g e s   eli cit   eff ort  
by creati ng a cli ma t e of co-operati on and reciproci t y,  rather t han by ent eri ng an i nst r um ent al
calculati on  of  t he  expected net   benefi t   of  shir ki ng.
I t   i s di f f i cult   t o t est  eff i ciency wa g e   t heory since standard com peti t i ve  m odel s also predict  a 
posi t i ve corr elati on bet w een product i vi t y and w ages.  Mo r eover,  one w oul d expect  to fi nd such 
paym ent s in si t uat i ons w here it  is dif f i cult  to observe,  and t hus m easure, wo r ker perf orm ance. 
Econom i sts have t herefore att em pted to t est the t heory by focusi ng on t he relati onshi p bet w een 
w ages and ot her forms  o f  eff ort  procurem ent.  For  exam ple, if  eff i ciency w ages are successful  in 
eli cit i ng eff ort  then,  ceteris pari bus,  one w oul d expect  fi r m s payi ng such prem ia to i nvest  few er 
r esources i n  m oni t ori ng  wo r ker  behavi our.
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An   alt ernat i ve me t hod of  i mp r ovi ng wo r ker  product i vi t y i s t o di vest   a share of  t he f i r m  i nt o 
t he hands of  wo r kers.  R ecent  years have wi t nessed a r esurgence of  i nt erest  i n em ployee shari ng.  
Re- ki ndl ed by W ei t zm an’s (1985) purport ed m acroeconom i c benefi t s of profi t  shari ng,  att enti on 
has t urned t ow ards t he mo r e r eadil y di scerni bl e,  and ori gi nal l y l auded,   mi croeconom i c benefi t s of 
em ployee shari ng  broadl y  defi ned  [ We i t zm an and  Kr use,   ( 1990),   Bl i nder  ( 1990)] .
Empl oyee shari ng has i mp l i cati ons f or bot h i nst r um ent al and gi f t -exchange m odel s of
eff i ciency wa g e s .   I n  t erms   of  t he  f orme r ,   a shari ng  schem e w oul d  di r ectl y  r educe t he  ma r gi nal   benefi t  
1  See,  f or  exam ple,  Bowl es ( 1985),   Ca l vo ( 1979)  and Eat on and Wh i t e ( 1983).   I t   i s possibl e,  how ever,   t hat   hi gh 
wa g e s  a r e a necessary com pensati ng di f f erenti al for occupat i ons t hat  requi r e distasteful l y hi gh rates of 
supervi sion [ A oki   ( 1984)] .   Evi dence of  a posi t i ve ( negat i ve)  r elati onshi p bet w een wa g e s   and m oni t ori ng i n t he 
Swedi sh publ i c  ( pri vat e)  sector  i s obt ained  by  Ar ai  ( 1994).2
of  shir ki ng.   I n  t he  extr em e case,  a self -em ployed  wo r ker  has  no  i ncenti ve  t o  shir k.   The  t em ptati on  t o 
f r ee r i de r enders t he i ssue som ew hat  l ess pel l uci d wh e n   a wo r k group i s consi dered,  but   even here 
t he exchange envi r onm ent   i s aff ected.  Di vest i ng part   of  t he enterpri se i s perhaps t he mo s t   generous 
gi f t   a f i r m  can off er  i t s wo r kforce and i f   i t   i s  via  an exchange of  gi f t s t hat   wa g e   prem ia eli cit   eff ort ,  
t hen  t he  quest i on  ari ses as t o  t he  ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y  t hat   wo r kers deri ve  f r om   such gi f t s.
An   i nt eresti ng,   yet   hi t hert o unexpl ored,  quest i on t hus ari ses as t o t he r elati onshi p bet w een 
em pl oyee shari ng and t he w age-m oni t ori ng  nexus.   A  pri ori   one  w oul d  expect  shari ng  t o  mi t i gat e t he 
need to m oni t or.  Wh e t her it  augm ent s or assuages the relati onshi p bet w een pay and supervi sion,  
and  t hus  i t s eff ect  on  t he  shape of  t he  t r ade off ,   i s r ather  l ess obvi ous.
I n t hi s paper  we   expl ore t he eff ects of  ‘ shari ng’  ( i . e.  profi t   shari ng,   perf orm ance r elated pay 
and em pl oyee share ow nership pl ans) on t he relati onshi p bet w een supervi sion and pay.  Ou r
em pir i cal result s based on t he Bri t i sh 1998 W ork Pl ace Em ployee Re l ati ons Sur vey suggest   an 
i nverse relati onshi p bet w een supervi sion and pay w i t h t hi s tr ade-off  bei ng m ore pronounced 
am ongst  fi r m s operati ng em pl oyee share ow nership or perf orm ance related pay schem es.  Thi s 
f i ndi ng w oul d appear to l end support  to i nst r um ental  eff i ciency wa g e   consi derati ons.   We   also f i nd 
t hat   em ployee share ow nership pl ans and perf orm ance r elated pay are r elati vel y mo r e successful   i n 
all eviati ng  t he  need t o  m oni t or.
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The  paper  i s set  out   as f ol l ow s:   Secti on  I I   di scusses som e background  i ssues concerni ng  t he 
r elati onshi p bet w een pay,   supervi sion,   and shari ng.   Secti on I I I   sets out   t he t heoreti cal  underpi nni ng 
t o our study w hi l st Secti on IV d e s c r i bes our dat a and m ethodol ogy.  Ou r  em pir i cal result s are 
presented i n  Secti on  V  and  our  f i nal   com m ents i n  Secti on  VI .
II. B ackground
W ages  and  M oni t ori ng
Econom i sts have l ong recogni sed that  there are subst anti al di f f erences in t he rew ards t o si mi l ar 
occupat i ons  across i ndust r i es.  I t   i s onl y  r ecentl y,   how ever,   t hat   t hey  have  associated t hese  vari ati ons
2  We   use  t he  t erm s ‘superv ision’  and  ‘ m oni t ori ng’  i nt erchangeably  i n  wh a t   f ol l ow s.   Al t hough  supervi sors have 
di f f erent  f unct i ons  at  di f f erent  f i r ms ,   and  f i r ms   ma y   ut i l i se ot her  f orms   of  t echnol ogy  t o  m oni t or  em ployees ( e.g.  
com put ers),  t he  supervi sor- t o- staff   r ati o  i s l i kel y  t o  be hi ghl y  corr elated wi t h  t he  extent  of  em ployee m oni t ori ng 
[ Gr oshen  and  Kr uegger  ( 1990)] .3
wi t h di f f erences i n m oni t ori ng.   I n one of  t he earl i est  studi es D unl op ( 1957)  observed t hat   t he hi ghest  
payi ng t r ucki ng f i r m  i n Bos t on i n 1951 wa s   payi ng i t s dri vers 1. 88 t i me s   t hat   of  i t s l ow est   payi ng 
com peti t or.   At   any poi nt   i n t i me   such a r ange of  pay coul d  r efl ect  a t r ansit ory  dem and  shock  dri vi ng 
up wa g e s   i n part i cular  i ndust r i es along short -run  i nel asti c l abour  suppl y  curves.   I f   t hi s we r e t he  case, 
how ever,   one w oul d not   expect  t o see t he sam e i ndust r i es r em aini ng at  t he t op ( or  bot t om )  of  t he 
di str i but i on decade aft er decade. Ye t  indust r y w age di f f erenti als over the past  century have been 
r em arkabl y persistent  [ see,  f or  exam ple,  Ga r bari no ( 1950),   Sl i chter  ( 1950),   Cul l en ( 1956),   Re de r  
( 1962),   Be l l   and  Fr eem an ( 1985)  and  Kr ueger  and  S u mme r s ( 1987)] .
Two  r egul ari t i es em erge f r om  t he vari ous att em pts t o account   f or  such assidui t y vis.  hi gher 
wa g e s   are usual l y associated wi t h:   ( i )   hi gher  profi t s and /   or  concentr ati on [ see Di ckens and Ka t z 
( 1987)  and Kr ueger  and S u mme r s ( 1987)] ;   and ( i i ) ,   l arger  pl ant  and /   or  f i r m  size [ see Br ow n and 
M edoff  (1985),  Kr use (1992)] .  The f i r st fi ndi ng m i ght  be i nt erpreted as support  for Ak e r l of’ s 
( 1982)  gi f t -exchange m odel   of  eff i ciency wa g e s .
3  A nd assum ing t hat   m oni t ori ng costs i ncrease wi t h 
pl ant  size,  t he second w oul d seem  to confi r m  t he w age-m oni t ori ng t r ade-off   predicted by Shapi r o 
and  St i gl i t z ( 1984).
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M easuri ng t he t r ade-off  bet w een w ages and m oni t ori ng expl i cit l y,  how ever,  has proved 
almo s t   as vexi ng as studyi ng t he di r ect  eff ect  of  hi gh wa g e s   on em ployee behavi our.   Two  probl em s 
are part i cularl y i r ksom e.   The  f i r st  concerns om i t t ed vari able bi as.  I n m any em ploym ent   r elati onshi ps 
a singl e em ployer  opt i ma l l y chooses bot h t he l evel  of  wa g e s   and supervi sion.   Such simu l t aneit y i s 
probl em ati c because om it t ed aspects of hum an r esource pol i cies t hat   aff ect  wa g e s   ( e.g.   em ployee 
screening or t r aini ng procedures) ma y  a l so be corr elated w it h supervi sory i nt ensit y and m i ght ,  
t herefore,  ma s k   t he  underl yi ng  t r ade-off   bet w een wa g e s   and  supervi sion.
5
The s econd di f f i cult y i s  t he m easurem ent of supervi sory i nt ensit y.  Mo s t  studi es m easure 
supervi sion by t he rati o of supervi sors to supervi sed. Such ‘ span of cont r ol ’  m easures are
probl em ati c because m any supervi sors spend onl y a fr acti on of thei r  wo r k t i me  mo n i t ori ng non-
3  I t   coul d  also be  t he  case t hat   t here are unobserved  qual i t y  di f f erences i n  wo r kers i nduci ng  bot h  hi gher  profi t s 
and  hi gher  wa g e s   [ Ca i n  ( 1976)] .
4 St udi es that  find expl i cit  evidence of a w age-supervi sion t rade-off   i ncl ude Kr ueger  ( 1991)  and Kr use ( 1992).  
Som ewhat   am biguous  r esult s are  r eport ed  i n  N eal  ( 1993),   Fi t zroy  and  Kr aft   ( 1986)  and  Br unel l o  ( 1995).  
5  The  presence  of  wa g e   bargai ni ng  w oul d,   of  course,  abate  t hi s pr obl em .4
supervi sors and t hei r  incl usi on  i n  a m easure of  m oni t ori ng  i nt ensi t y  ma y   exasperate any  bi as  r esul t i ng 
f r om   t he  simu l t aneous det ermi nat i on  of  wa g e s   and  supervi sion  [ Kr use  ( 1992)] .
A  good i l l ust r ati on of t hi s latt er i ssue is found i n t he st udy by Leonard (1987) wh i ch
r egresses t he w ages of staff  wo r kers across six occupat i ons on t he supervi sor-to-st aff   r ati o i n a 
s am ple of  US  hi gh t echnol ogy f i r ms .   Leonard’s   r esul t s   i ndi cate a posi t i ve,   but   generall y i nsi gni f i cant,  
r elati onshi p bet w een pay and supervi sion and l ead him t o concl ude against   t he s hi r ki ng eff i ciency 
wa g e   m odel .   The  absence of  corr elati on  ma y ,   how ever,   r esult   f r om   endogenei t y  probl em s r elati ng  t o 
a possibl e subst i t ut i on bet w een supervi sors and staff  wo r kers in t he product i on funct i on.  An y
product i on t echnol ogy exhi bi t i ng a non-zero m argi nal  r ate of t echni cal subst i t ut i on bet w een
supervi sory and non-supervi sory i nput s w il l  induce a posi t i ve t r ade-off  bet w een w ages and t he 
supervi sor-to-st aff  rati o.
6 On l y i f  supervi sory and st aff  wa g e  r ates vary i ndependent l y,  or if  the 
supervi sor-to-st aff  rati o i s exogenousl y det ermi ned,  wi l l  it  be possi bl e to st ati sti call y i dent i f y t he 
i m pact  of  supervi sion on wa g e s   f r om  such a r egression.   I n Leonard’s analysi s i t   i s l i kel y t hat   any 
t r ade-off   bet w een supervi sion  and  pay  i s bi ased and  perhaps dom i nat ed by  such subst i t ut i on  eff ects.
An  i ma g i nat i ve at t em pt to ci r cum vent thi s type of endogenei t y probl em  is undert aken by 
Gr oshen and K rueger (1990) w ho focus on t he supervi sor-to-st aff  rati os for vari ous registered 
occupat i ons across 300 U S hospi t als. The specif i cit y of t hei r  study i s rati onal i zed by Federal
r egul ati ons w hi ch render t he supervi sor-to-st aff  r ati o l argel y exogenous.  Consi stent wi t h t he
m oni t ori ng vers i on of  eff i ciency wa g e   t heory t hey f i nd a s t r ong hospi t al -specif i c eff ect  on  wa g e s   t hat
cuts across occupat i ons – i f   a hospi t al  pai d r elati vel y hi gh wa g e s   t o one occupat i on i t   wa s   l i kel y t o 
pay relati vel y hi gh w ages t o ot her occupat i ons as w el l .  The i nt er-occupat i onal  pat t ern of the 
supervi sor-to-st aff   r ati o,   how ever,   wa s   mu c h   l ess uni f or m.   The  wa g e s   of  staff   nurses,  f or  exam ple, 
we r e negat i vel y corr elated wi t h t he extent  of  supervi sion wh i ch suggest ed t hat   such wo r kers di d not  
r eceive com pensati ng prem ia in return for closer supervi sion.  The authors concl ude t hat  alt hough 
t hei r  fi ndi ngs suggest  a w age-m oni t ori ng t r ade-off ,  they are also consi stent wi t h t he al t ernat i ve 
6  A ssum e,  f or  exam ple,  a Cobb-D ougl as  product i on  funct i on 
b aS AL Q =   wh e r e  L  and  S  denot e  non- supervi sory
and  supervi sory i nput s respecti vel y  and  w here Q  denot es  out put .   I f   t he  f i r m  f aces  a  com peti t i ve  cost  f unct i on  C
=w L   + rS t hen cost   mi ni mi zati on i mp l i es  () () r w L S a b =   such t hat   i ncreases i n  w–   t he  wa g e   rate of  non-
supervi sory  wo r kers -   wi l l   r aise t he  supervi sor- t o- staff   r ati o  even  i f   supervi sion  has  no  di r ect  eff ect  on  em ployee 
ut i l i t y  or  m oni t ori ng.5
expl anati on t hat  hospi t als w hich supervi se thei r  staff  mo r e closel y m i ght  prefer t o em pl oy l ow-
qual i t y/ l ow   pay  wo r kers.
A  simi l ar  f ocus on a specif i c i ndust r y enables Re bi t z er  ( 1995)  t o  gi r dl e t he  om i t t ed vari able 
probl em .  He r e t he f ocus i s cont r act  wo r kers i n t he US  pet r ochem ci al  i ndust r y.   Such wo r kers are 
answ erable t o t wo   di f f erent  em ployers – t he  host   pl ant  and  t he  cont r actor  - w ho  t oget her  shape t he 
personnel  practi ces governi ng t hei r  em ploym ent  cont r acts .  C oncerns about  legal li abil i t y l i mi t  the 
degree t o wh i ch host   pl ants can i nt erf ere i n t he hum an r esource practi ces of  t he cont r actors.  As   a 
r esult ,  esti ma t es of t he eff ects of host  safety supervi sion on t he w ages set  by cont r actors are 
r elati vel y l ess em broi l ed by om i t t ed vari able bias than est i ma t es deri ved fr om  convent i onal
em ploym ent  r elati onshi ps.  Re bi t zer f i nds evi dence t hat  hi gh l evels of supervi sion are indeed
associated wi t h  l ow er  wa g e   l evels,  and  since t he  l i kel y  eff ect  of  om i t t ed vari able bi as i s t o  r educe t he 
observed  t r ade-off   bet w een supervi sion  and  wa g e s ,   he  concl udes  t hat   such evidence  i s l i kel y  t o  be  a 
conservat i ve  esti ma t e of  t he  w age-supervi sion  t r ade-off .
Tw o ot her studi es that  fi nd generall y support i ve evidence of  a w age-supervi sion t r ade-off
are Kr ueger  ( 1991)  and  Kr use  ( 1992).   Kr ueger  exam ines  pay  i n  com pany-ow ned  f ast-food  out l ets 
wh e r e m anagers w ere paid a fi xed sal ary and i n fr anchised out l ets w here the ow ner’ s incom e 
depended on t he out l et’ s perf orm ance. Kr ueger hypot hesi ses that  pay i n com pany-ow ned out l ets 
w oul d be relati vel y hi gh because supervi sion by hi ghl y m ot i vat ed ow ners is less costl y t han
supervi sion by hi r ed m anagers. Consi stent wi t h t hi s hypot hesi s, he fi nds t ot al com pensati on t o be 
approxi ma t ely 2 (3. 5) per cent hi gher i n com pany-ow ned out l ets. Kr use i nvest i gat es the 1980 
Sur vey  of  Job  Cha r acteri sti cs and  concl udes  t hat   hourl y  wa g e s   i ncrease wi t h  establi shm ent  size even 
aft er cont r ol l i ng for personal  characteri sti cs, occupat i on and i ndust r y.  Mo r eover,  em ployee self -
r eport ed supervi sion w as found t o exhi bi t  a generall y negat i ve relati onshi p w i t h w ages - dai l y 
supervi sed w orkers received 1. 2 per cent low er pay t han t hei r  w eekly supervi sed count erpart s 
ceteris pari bus.
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7  It  shoul d  be  not ed t hat   Kr use  concedes  t hat   wh i l st  such f i ndi ngs  are  generall y  consi stent  wi t h  eff i ciency  wa g e  
t heory,  t hey are also com pati bl e w it h t he i dea that  supervi sion i s negat i vel y corr elated w it h ot herwi se
unobserved  hi gher  abil i t y.6
St udi es that  fail  t o fi nd concl usi ve evi dence of a w age-m oni t ori ng t r ade-off   i ncl ude N eal 
( 1993),   Fi t zroy and Kr aft   ( 1986)  and Br unel l o ( 1995).   N eal  ( 1993),   usi ng supervi sion dat a f r om  
t he  1977  wa v e   of  t he  Panel   Sur vey  of  I ncom e,   f i nds  t hat   wo r kers i n  hi gh-w age i ndust r i es are at  l east 
as int ensivel y supervi sed as low -w age, secondary sector wo r kers, and no evi dence t hat  int er-
i ndust r y di f f erences in m oni t ori ng cont r i but e to i nt er-indust r y wa g e   di f f erenti als .   Si mi l arl y,   Fi t zroy 
and Kr aft   ( 1986)  f i nd t he supervi sor-to-st aff   r ati o t o be i nsi gni f i cantl y r elated t o wa g e s   i n a sam ple 
of 65 W est  Ge r ma n  me t al wo r ki ng fi r ms .  Br unel l o (1995) expl ores the relati onshi p bet w een pay 
and bot h t he quant i t y ( proxi ed by t he supervi sor-to-st aff   r ati o)  and qual i t y of  supervi sion ( proxi ed 
by f actors such as t he  age and  experi ence of  t he  supervi sors).   Wi t hout   cont r ol l i ng  f or  qual i t y,   a sm all  
but  si gni f i cant tr ade-off  bet w een pay and t he supervi sion rati o i s found for bot h m anual  and non-
m anual  wo r kers. The i ncl usi on of qual i t y m easures, how ever,  abates t he t r ade-off   t o t he extent  of 
i nsi gni f i cance i n  t he  case of  m anual   wo r kers.
Empl oyee shari ng
Empl oyee shari ng has imp l i cati ons for inst r um ent al and gi f t -exchange m odel s of  eff i ciency wa g e s ,  
i m pacti ng on bot h t he ma r gi nal   net   benefi t   of  s hi r ki ng and on t he wi der  exchange envi r onm ent .
8  An  
i nt eresti ng,   yet   hi t hert o unexpl ored,  quest i on t hus ari ses as t o t he consangui ni t y of  pay,   supervi sion 
and shari ng.  Int r ospect i on w oul d suggest  that  shari ng al l eviates the need t o m oni t or.  Wh e t her it  
augm ent s or  assuages t he r elati onshi p bet w een pay and supervi sion,   and t hus i t s eff ect  on t he shape 
of  t he  t r ade off ,   i s l ess clear.
I n t erms   of  t he i nst r um ent al  approach one mi ght   expect  t he t r ade-off   t o be sharpened - an 
i ncrease in rem unerati on i nduci ng a l arger cut i n m oni t ori ng ceteris pari bus.  The conventi onal  
eff i ciency wa g e   t r ade-off   bet w een pay and m oni t ori ng ari ses because an i ncrease i n t he f orme r   wi l l  
i ncrease t he expected net   benefi t   of not  s hi r ki ng - i f   a wo r ker  chooses t o shir k he/ she r uns som e 
r i sk of  bei ng det ected,  f i r ed,  and t hus of  not   r eceivi ng t he extr a pay.   Si nce i t   i s i n t he f i r m’ s i nt erest 
t o gi ve t he wo r ker  a zero net   benefi t ,   i t   can econom i se on m oni t ori ng and t hus r aise t he ut i l i t y of 
8  I ndeed:  ‘ Of f eri ng wo r kers i ncreased  i nvol vem ent   i n  decision- ma k i ng,   a  f i nanci al  stake  i n  t he  perf orm ance  of  t he 
f i r m,   di sclosi ng  i nforma t i on  about ,  int er al i a,   f ut ure i nvest me n t   pl ans and  t he  f i r m’ s f i nanci al  sit uat i on,   and  t he 
devel opm ent  of com m uni cati on channel s betw een m anagem ent  and w orkers, are all  seen as centr al t o 
encouraging  l oyal t y,   mo t i vat i on  and  c o mmi t me n t   and,   t hereby,   t o  r educi ng  t he  need  t o  i nvoke  close  m oni t ori ng. ’  
[ M cN abb  and  Wh i t f i eld  ( 1998),   p.   174].7
shir ki ng by gi vi ng w orkers a bigger chance of obt aini ng t he pay.  If   a shari ng schem e r elates,  or  i s 
perceived by wo r kers t o r elate,  i ndi vi dual   r em unerati on t o i ndi vi dual   eff ort ,   t hen t he net   benefi t   of 
shir ki ng i s i ncreased f urt her - a shir ker  f aces t he com pounded l oss of  bei ng det ected and of  l osi ng 
m oney.
I f ,   how ever,  it   i s   t hrough an exchange of  gi f t s   t hat   wa g e s   i nduce eff ort   t hen t he s i t uat i on i s  
l ess clear.   A  r i se i n wa g e s   ma y   be r egarded as a gi f t   on t he part   of  t he f i r m  and t hus ma y   i nduce 
mo r e eff ort  and l ess need to m oni t or.  Si mi l arl y,  a shari ng arr angem ent  bet we e n   t he f i r m  and i t s  
wo r kforce coul d generate t he sam e f eeli ngs i r r especti ve of  t he l evel  of  r em unerati on.   I f   wa g e s   are 
i ncreased i n a s hari ng f i r m  t hen t he cruci al  i s s ue i s   t he ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y t he wo r kforce deri ves  f r om  t hi s  
gi f t-  i s i t   mo r e or  l ess t han  t hey  w oul d  have  deri ved  had  t hey  r eceived  such wa g e s   i n  a convent i onal  
non-shari ng  envi r onm ent ?
On e   mi ght   expect  t hat   any group i ncenti ve schem e advocati ng equal   profi t   shares r egardl ess 
of i ndi vi dual  perf orm ance w il l  have l i t t l e eff ect on t he at t i t udes and perf orm ance of i ndi vi dual
wo r kers.  For   exam ple:
A  di l ut i on  or  f r ee r i der  probl em  seem s t o  ari se w henever  i t   i s hard  t o  m oni t or  a singl e person’s 
cont r i but i on,   as i s presum ably  f r equent l y  t he  case.  An   external i t y  i s present  because any  one 
person’s rew ar d depends on everyone el se’s effort.  Wi t h n me mb e r s of  t he  group,   t he  extr a 
profi t   shari ng  r ew ard  associated  wi t h  ma r gi nal   eff ort   on  any  singl e  wo r ker’ s part   i s di l ut ed  by  a 
f actor of 1/n.  The r esult  is an ineff i cientl y l ow  l evel of eff ort ,  wh i ch is low er as n  i s l arger.  
[ We i t zm an  and  Kr use  ( 1990),   p.   98].
The  probl em  has  been i nt erpreted as a ‘ pri soners’  di l e mma ’   wi t h  each wo r ker  hol di ng  back eff ort   i n 
order  t o  f r ee r i de  off   hi s/her  coll eagues.   A ccepti ng  t hi s argum ent ,   one  w oul d  expect  shari ng  schem es 
t o  i m pact  negl i gi bl y,   i f   at  all ,   on  l arge  organi s ati ons.
9
Di l ut i on aside,   how ever,   t here are ot her  probl em s associated wi t h em ployee shari ng.   Fi r st,  
all  schem es that  ti e pay t o perf orm ance expose w orkers to unw ant ed ri sk. The opt i ma l  cont r act 
mu s t   now  bal ance the cont r adictory r equi r em ents of  l i nki ng pay t o eff ort   and l i mi t i ng r i sk,  and t he 
9  Ther e i s an i m port ant  caveat  t o  t hi s argum ent .   I f   t he  ‘ gam e’  i s r epeated  t hen  co-operati on  ma y   be  sustainabl e. 
I nt ui t i vel y,  l ong t erm e mp l oym ent  r elati onshi ps enable co-operati n g  me mb e r s to puni sh thei r  fr ee ri di ng 
coll eagues by,  for exam ple, wi t hhol di ng t hei r  ow n eff ort  or ost r acising t he off endi ng ant i - social culpri t s.
Mo r eover,   i t   has  been  show n  t hat   an  i nsi gni f i cantl y  sm all   am ount   of  co-operati on  i s suff i cient  t o  det er  f r ee  r i di ng 
[ Fi t zroy  and  Kr aft   ( 1986)] .8
opt i ma l  profi t  share is typi call y i nversely related to t he degree of ri sk aversion and/ or l evel of
uncert aint y,   and  posi t i vel y  r elated t o  t he  elasti cit y  r esponse  of  out put   t o  i ncreased eff ort .
10
A nd fi nal l y,  all  group i ncenti ve schem es have i mp l i cati ons f or wo r ker part i cipat i on i n
m anagem ent   and cont r ol .   Requi r i ng wo r kers t o bear  mo r e r i sk ma y   open t he door  t o dem ands f or 
co-determi nat i on.   Wh e t her  or  not   t hi s i s desi r able r em ains an open quest i on.   The  ‘ propert y r i ght s’ 
vi ew  is that  profi t  shari ng i s ineff i cient because it  di vert s cont r ol  and ow nership t ow ards
i ndi vi dual i sti call y ori ented w orkers w hose m ot i vat i on i s dil ut ed by fr ee ri der issues [Al chian and 
De ms e t z (1972),  Jensen and M eckli ng (1979)] .  Par t i cipat i on m ay,  how ever,  raise product i vi t y i f  
wo r kers are bet t er  equi pped t o mo t i vat e and m oni t or  each ot her  t han m anagem ent ,   or  i f   t hey can 
provi de t echni cal  i nforma t i on t o m anagem ent   t hat   w oul d ot herwi se be t oo costl y or  t i me   consum i ng
t o obt ain [O’ De l l  and M cA dam s (1987),  Ka n t er ( 1987)] .  Si mi l ar benefi t s m ight  i ncl ude t he
pot enti al  f or  i mp r oved channels of  com m uni cati on,   bet t er  confl i ct  r esolut i on,   a greater  wi l l i ngness t o 
accept new  t echnol ogy,  and an i ncreased possibi l i t y of  acqui r i ng on-t he-j ob hum an capit al  f r om  
ot her  wo r kers.
11
Wh a t ever the t r ue relati onshi p bet w een em ployee shari ng,  part i cipat i on and product i vi t y,  
t hi s study i s hindered by a lack of informa t i on regardi ng t he ext ent of co-determi nat i on wi t hi n t he 
panel  of f i r ms .  Thi s  i s  pot enti all y seri ous:  “.. .  m any st udi es i ncl ude vari ables onl y on fi nanci al
part i cipat i on ( r eturn r i ght s)  or  part i cipat i on i n decision ma k i ng ( cont r ol   r i ght s),   but   not   bot h.   Thi s i s 
extr em ely probl em ati c because . . .   t here are str ong t heoreti cal  r easons t o bel i eve t hat   t he t wo   r i ght s 
i nt eract wi t h each other and do so non-m onot oni call y.  The omi t t ed vari able is severe, and t he 
esti ma t es of the em pl oyee ow nership vari ables that  ari se fr om  such studi es m ay have t he w rong 
sign. ” [ Be n - Ne r   and  Jones  ( 1995),   p.   551].
10 It  shoul d be not ed, how ever,  that  alt hough ri sk consi derati ons reduce the opt i ma l  profi t  share, a contr act 
com pri sing  f i xed  r em unerati on  onl y  i s very  unl i kel y  [ Ha r t   and  Ho l ms t r om   ( 1987)] .
11  To  ascert ain  t he  me r i t   of  such argum ent s Levi ne  and  Tyson  ( 1990)  surveyed  t we n t y- ni ne  em pir i cal  studi es  of 
wo r ker  part i cipat i on  and  f ound  onl y  t wo   concl udi ng  against   part i cipat i on.   In cont rast,   fourt een  studi es  found  i n 
f avour of part i cipat i on w i t h t he rem aini ng t hi r t een off eri ng som ew hat  am biguous result s. Levi ne and Tyson 
concl uded t hat  successful  part i cipat i on requi r es: ( i )  som e form o f  profi t  shari ng t o rew ard co- operati ve
behavi our;   ( i i )   guaranteed l ong t erm  em ploym ent   t o i ncrease t he t i me   hori zons of  wo r kers and so r ender  t hem  
mo r e adaptable to change,  (i i i )  relati vel y narr ow  w age di f f erenti als to prom ot e group cohesi veness;  and (i v) 
guaranteed wo r ker  r i ght s  -   f or  exam ple di sm issal  onl y  f or  j ust   cause.9
Som ewhat  surpri singl y t here has been relati vel y l i t t l e contem porary research int o t hese 
i ssues. Sever al researchers have focused on t he ext r em e case of em ployee-ow ned f i r ms   and co-
operati ves  [ see,  f or  exam ple,  Gr eenberg  ( 1986),   Ba r t l ett   etal  ( 1992)]   but   t o  our  know l edge  no  one 
has  expl ored t he  s i t uat i on  wi t hi n  profi t   s hari ng  f i r ms .  
III. T heoreti cal  U nderpinni ng
Som e i nsi ght  i nt o t he possi bl e relati onshi p bet w een em ployee shari ng and supervi sion m ay be 
di scerned f r om  t he f ol l ow i ng exposi t ory m odel .   A ssum e t hat   wo r kers are hom ogenous r i sk neut r al 
wi t h ut i l i t y f unct i ons  of  t he f orm  e m u − = .m   r epresents i ncom e  and  e r epresents eff ort .   Empl oyed 
wo r kers ma k e   a di screte all   or  not hi ng choi ce as r egards t he provi sion of  eff ort   t o t hei r   em ployer 
such t hat   () e e, 0 = , 0 > e .   The  f i r m  has access t o som e m oni t ori ng t echnol ogy defi ned t hough t he 
f unct i on () k p  wh e r e k denot es the val ue of resources devot ed to m oni t ori ng and  () k p  the 
probabi l i t y t hat  a shir ker wi l l  be det ected.
12 W e assum e  () 0 > ′ k p () 0 < ′ ′ k p , () 0 0 = p   and 





13  De t ecti on  i mp l i es  i nst antaneous  di s mi s s al  and  unem pl oym ent   ut i l i t y b.
14
Fi xed W ages
Consi der fi r st the fi xed w age scenari o.  The f i r m’ s probl em  is to m axi mi se profi t s subject to t he 
const r aint s that  the w orker receives at  least hi s/her reservat i on ut i l i t y ( viz. e b+ )   and t hat ,   once 
em ployed,   he/ she does not   shir k.   Thi s l att er  necessit ates t he  wo r ker  bei ng  pai d  t he  l ow est   wa g e   t hat  
sati sfi es t he  ‘ non-shi r ki ng  const r aint ’   ( NSC) :
() () [] w k p b k p e w − + ≥ − 1 ( 1)
Sat i sfacti on  of  ( 2)  i mp l i es an opt i ma l   ( viz.  ‘ eff i ciency’)   wa g e   of:
()
() k p





12 To avoi d unnecessary com pl i cati ons w e assum e that  the cri t eri a on w hich thi s judgem ent is based are 
veri fiable  by  an  i ndependent   arbit rator  such t hat   t here  i s no  di sput e  about   t he  firm ’s assessm ent.
13    I t   i s t hus  t echnicall y  possibl e  f or  t he  f i r m  t o  perf ectl y  mo n i t or  wo r ker  perf orm ance.  Si nce  our  f ocus  of  i nt erest 
i s not   t he  opt i ma l   l evel  of  m oni t ori ng  we   assum e t hat   product i on  and  m oni t ori ng  t echnol ogi es are such t hat   i t   i s 
alwa y s   i n  t he  i nt erests of  t he  f i r m  t o  m oni t or  i mpe r f ectl y.
14 Al l ow i ng t echni call y di sm issed shir kers som e chance of re- em ploym ent  w oul d not  change t he qual i t ati ve 
aspects of  our  concl usi ons.10
such t hat   wo r kers r eceive som e em ploym ent   r ents but   are j ust   i ndi f f erent  bet w een shir ki ng and not  













Fi xed W ages  wi t h  Rem unerat i ve Shi rking  Cos t s 
Consi der now  a m ore general case in w hi ch the i ndi vi dual ’ s  wa g e  i s  som e funct i on of hi s / her 
perf orm ance such that  there is som e rem unerati ve penal t y associated w it h shi r ki ng.  To be sure, 
ass um e t hat   t he s hi r ki ng wa g e   i s   gi ven by  () z w w − = 1   wh e r e  () 1 , 0 ∈ z   i s a param eter  denot i ng  t he 
r em unerati ve cost  associated wi t h shir ki ng.   I f  z =  0 t hen we   r eturn t o t he standard f i xed wa g e   case 
as above.   As  z  i ncreases  t he  i ndi vi dual   s uff ers   an i ncreasi ng  f i nanci al  penal t y  f r om   s hi r ki ng  and  i n  t he 
l i mi t   l oses  all   hi s / her  wa g e   as z approaches uni t y.   The  non  shir ki ng  const r aint   i s now :
() () [] () z w k p b k p e w − − + ≥ − 1 1 ( 4)
Sat i s f acti on  of  wh i ch i mp l i es  an eff i ciency wa g e   of:
()
() ( ) z z k p







The  nat ure of  t he z param eter is cruci al to t he shape of the w age-m oni t ori ng t r ade off .   The  t wo  
l i mi t i ng  cases  are:
()
() k p







0 l i m ( 6)




1 l i m ( 7)
Asz  t ends t o zero t here is no rem unerati ve cost  associated w it h shi r ki ng and w e deri ve t he 
eff i ciency wa g e   defi ned i n equat i on ( 2)  above.   As  z  t ends  t o  uni t y  t he  r em unerati ve  cost  associated 
wi t h  shir ki ng  i s absolut e and  t he  eff i ciency wa g e   i s consequent l y  r educed.  Mo r eover,   consi deri ng  t he 






























l i m ( 11)
Thus i r r especti ve of the rem unerati ve cost  associated w it h shi r ki ng t he fi r m  can hold t he w orker 
dow n  t o  hi s/her  r eservat i on  wa g e   provi di ng  i t   perf ectl y  m oni t ors. 
The  w age-m oni t ori ng  t r ade-off   i s   gi ven  by:  
() ( ) []
() ( ) [] e z bz k p










wi t h l i mi t s :
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()



















→ b k p dw
dk
z ( 14)
The  t r ade-off   depends cruci all y on t he val ue of  z.  Wi t h  no  r em unerati ve  shir ki ng  costs we   deri ve  t he 
convent i onal   i nverse r elati onshi p.   Wi t h  com plete costs t he  t r ade off   i s posi t i ve,   t he  expected ut i l i t y  of 
s hi r ki ng i ncreasi ng w i t h t he l evel of wi t h m oni t ori ng si nce it  is  now  i n t he w orker’ s  int erest  to be 
det ected and fi r ed since onl y t hen w i l l  any rem unerati on be received.  The cri t i cal zv a l ue occurs 




z e z bz
+
= → = − −
* * * 0 1 ( 15)
Thus t he t r ade off   i s negat i ve ( posi t i ve)  f or  val ues of z l ess t han ( greater  t han) z
*.   The  key poi nt   i s 







Fi gure I:  W age-Mo n i t ori ng  Tr ade   Of f s
W ages,   M oni t ori ng  and  Shari ng
We   now  devel op a som ew hat  mo r e f orma l   m odel   of  em ployee shari ng.   We   assum e f or  simp l i cit y 
t hat  fi r ms  e mp l oy a si ngl e w orker and face a stochast i c revenue funct i on  () i e f q ;  wh e r e  i q   i s a 
param eter  r epresenti ng  a r andom   shock  t o  dem and  or  product i vi t y.   We   assum e t hat   i q   t akes one  of 
t wo   val ues,   H q wi t h  probabi l i t y s  or  L q   wi t h probabi l i t y () s − 1 . i q   i s r evealed t o  bot h  t he  wo r ker 
and  t he  f i r m  aft er  t he  em ploym ent   cont r act  has  been signed  and  i m pacts on  r evenue as f ol l ow s:
() () () () L H L H f f e f e f q q q q , 0 , 0 , , > = > ( 17)
We   envi sage a simp l e em ployee shari ng  cont r act  of  t he  f orm:
() () i e f w w q l l ; 1 + − = ( 18)
wh e r ew  r epresents t ot al  r em unerati on,  w   t he com ponent   of  t ot al  r em unerati on t hat   i s ‘ f i xed’  ( i . e. 
i ndependent   of  wo r ker  perf orm ance),   and  [] 1 , 0 ∈ l   t he l evel  of  wo r ker  equi t y ( vis.  t he f r acti on of 
t ot al  r em unerati on  t hat   depends  on  i ndi vi dual   eff ort ) .
15
The  NSC  now   t akes t he  f orm:
15  We   assum e i n  wh a t   f ol l ow s  t hat   t he  extent  of  wo r ker  equi t y,   as m easured by l ,   i s exogenous  bei ng  f i xed  by 
custom   or  governm ent   di r ecti ve.   Thi s i s obvi ousl y  a simp l i sti c assum pti on  and  a f ul l er  exposi t i on  w oul d  seek t o 
expl ain  t he  di str i but i on  of  di f f erent  cont r actual   arr angem ent s.13
() () [] () () () []
() () [] () () [] () () () [] {} L H
L H
f w s f w s k p b k p
e e f w s e f w s
q l l q l l
q l l q l l
, 0 1 1 , 0 1 1
, 1 1 , 1
+ − − + + − − +
≥
− + − − + + −
( 19)
I t   i s apparent  f r om   t he  above  t hat   t he  probabi l i t y  of  det ecti on  i s gi ven  by  t he  probabi l i t y  t hat   t he  f i r m 
m oni t ors plus t he probabi l i t y t hat  i t  does not  m oni t or but  t hat  t he w orker i s ‘unl ucky’,  viz.
() ( ) () [] k p s k p − − + 1 1 .   We   can t herefore r educe equat i on  ( 17)  t o:
() () ( ) () [] () () () [] H L H f w s b s e e f s e sf w q l l q q l l , 0 1 ~ ~ 1 , 1 , 1 + − + − ≥ − − + + − ( 20)
wh e r e () [] k p s s − = 1 ~ .   Sol vi ng  f or  t he  base  wa g e   yi elds:
() ()
() () ( ) [] {} ( ) [] L H e f k p s e sf e b s
s
w q q l
l
, 1 2 , ~ 1 ~ 1 1
1
− − − − + −
− −
= ( 21)
and  i mp l i es t ot al  ‘ eff i ciency’  r em unerati on  of:
()
() f s s e
s




1 * l ( 22)
wh e r e () () L H e f e f f q q ; ; − = ∆ .   Tot all y di f f erenti ati ng t hi s expression yi elds t he t r ade-off s bet w een 
pay,   supervi sion  and  shari ng:
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Equat i on  ( 25)  i s unequi vocall y  negat i ve.   The  sign  of  equat i ons  ( 23)  and  ( 24)  depend  cruci all y  on  t he 
t erm () e f s − ∆ l .   I f   () s e f l ≤ ∆   t hen equat i ons ( 23)  and ( 24)  are negat i ve such t hat   profi t   shari ng 
f i r ms  f ace the sam e i nverse tr ade-off  but  m oni t or r elati vel y l ess  t han t hei r  non-profi t  shari ng14
count erpart s.
16  I f   () s e f l > ∆   t hen equat i ons ( 23)  and ( 24)  are posi t i ve i mp l yi ng t hat   profi t   shari ng 
f i r ms   m oni t or  r elati vel y  mo r e and  f ace an upw ard  slopi ng  t r ade off .
U nder  t hese assum pti ons,   e f s = ∆   such t hat   e f s < ∆ l   and equat i ons ( 23) - ( 25)  are all  
negat i ve i mp l yi ng t hat :   ( a)  s hari ng f i r ms   devot e r elati vel y l ess   r esources  t o m oni t ori ng t han t hei r   non-
shari ng count erpart s; (b) l i ke t hei r  non-shari ng count erpart s, shari ng fi r ms  a l so face a tr ade-off
bet w een tot al rem unerati on and m oni t ori ng;  and (c) the t r ade-off   bet w een t ot al  r em unerati on and 
m oni t ori ng i s  hei ght ened am ongst  shari ng fi r m s – an i ncrease in t ot al r em unerati on i nduces a 
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Fi gure II:  Op t i ma l   Pay-Mo n i t oring  Tr ade   Of f s:  0 < dw dk
The  l att er  i s i l l ust r ated graphi call y  i n  Fi gure I I   above.   The  t wo   curves  r epresent  i so-profi t   l i nes  i n  ( w,
k)  space.  An   i ncrease i n t he shari ng coeff i cient  sharpens t he t r ade off   bet w een pay and m oni t ori ng.  
I nt ui t i vel y,  r ais i ng pay w i t hi n a shari ng fi r m wi l l  i nduce a relati vel y l arger cut i n m oni t ori ng
expendi t ure: ( i )  t he l ess  sensi t i ve i s  t he m oni t ori ng funct i on - i . e. t he sma l l er i s  t he fall  i n t he 
probabi l i t y of det ecti on brought  about  by t he reduct i on i n m oni t ori ng;   ( i i )   t he l arger  i s   t he l evel  of 
eff ort   r equi r ed by t he f i r m;   and ( i i i )   t he l arger  i s t he pot enti al  l oss t o shir ki ng t hat   i s i ndependent   of 
t he f i r m’ s   abil i t y t o m oni t or vis. f ∆ l - t hat   i s t he share of  profi t s gi ven over  t o wo r kers mu l t i pl i ed
by t he reduct i on i n profi t s induced by t he w orker’ s decision t o shi r k.  Thi s w il l  be zero for non-
16  No t e  t hat   0 = f D -   akin  t o  t he  z =  0  case  previousl y  –  ensures t he  convent i onal   i nverse  t rade off. 15
s hari ng  f i r ms .   Wi t hi n  a l arge  s hari ng  envi r onm ent   i t   coul d  be  zero  –  t he  second  t erm  of  t he  product   i n 
part i cular is  li kel y t o be negl i gi bl e. It  is  very unl i kel y,  how ever,  to be posi t i ve and i f  the shari ng 
arr angem ent s are ma d e   over  sm all er  sub-divi sions  t hen  our  predicti ons  w oul d  hol d.
17
These predicti ons are, how ever,  deri ved fr om  a st yl i sed inst rum ental  exposi t i on of
eff i ciency w ages. Mo r e generall y ,we  wo u l d expect  eff i ciency w ages to operate in bot h an
i nst r um ent al  and gi f t   exchange capacit y,   and i t   r em ains open t o quest i on as t o how  wo r kers mi ght  
i nt erpret  s uch gi f t s   wi t hi n a s hari ng envi r onm ent .   Do   t hey confer  i ncreasi ng or  di mi ni s hi ng ma r gi nal  
ut i l i t y? I f   em ployee shari ng i s i nt erpreted f avourably by wo r kers,  does t he addi t i onal   gi f t   of  supra-
com peti t i ve w ages el i cit  relati vel y m ore or l ess eff ort  i n a shari ng or a non-shari ng fi r m?  Th e  
s oci ol ogi cal  basi s   of  gi f t s   r enders   s uch i s s ues  vi r t ual l y i mp e n e t r able t o  t heoreti cal  exposi t i on  and  i t   i s 
t hus  t o  our  em pir i cal  evidence  t hat   we   are obl i ged  t o  t urn.
IV . D ata  and  Me t hodol ogy
Da t a
Ou r  dat a are deri ved fr om  1998 Cross-Secti on W orkpl ace Empl oyee Re l ati ons Sur vey ( WE R S )  
wh i ch i s   t he f ourt h i n a G overnm ent   f unded seri es of  surveys conduct ed at  Br i t i sh wo r kpl aces.  The 
ot her  t hree surveys we r e conduct ed i n 1980,   1984 and 1990.  The aim  of  t he survey i s t o provi de 
nat i onal l y r epresentati ve dat a on t he curr ent  state of  wo r kpl ace r elati ons and em ploym ent   practi ces
i n Bri t ain and i t  is regarded as a pri nci pal  source of informa t i on pert aini ng t o changes i n Bri t i sh 
i ndust r i al relati ons.  The overall  purpose of the W ERS i s ‘t o provi de i nforma t i on on t he st ate of 
m anagem ent-em ployee r elati ons  i n  Br i t ain. ’  
The Nat i onal  Ce nt r e for Soci al R esearch is responsi bl e for sam pli ng and st ati sti cal
consul t ancy, the conduct  of the fi eldw ork,  codi ng and preparati on of the fi nal  dat a. The  WE R S  
com pri ses three m ain secti ons;  t he ‘M anagem ent  Qu e s t i onnai r e’,  t he ‘Wo r ker Re pr esentati ve
Qu e s t i onnai r e’  and f i nal l y t he ‘ Empl oyee Qu e s t i onnai r e’.   For   t he purposes of  t hi s study,   we   have 
used t he dat a fr om  t he ‘M anagem ent  Qu e s t i onnai r e’ –  t he survey popul ati on bei ng al l  Br i t i s h
wo r kpl aces wi t h at  l east  t en em ployees except  f or  t hose i n agri cult ure,  hunt i ng  and  f orest r y,   f i s hi ng,  
17  No t e  t hat   t he  l evel  of  m oni t ori ng  expendi t ure  wi l l   also det ermi ne  t he  shape  of  t he  t r ade-off dependi ng  upon  t he 
l i neari t y  or  ot herwi se of  t he  avail able  m oni t ori ng  t echnol ogy.16
mi ni ng and quarr yi ng,   pri vat e househol ds wi t h em ployed persons and extr a-terr i t ori al  organi sati ons.  
A pproxi ma t ely 3, 200 fi r ms  we r e asked to t ake part  in t he W ERS – t hereby coveri ng a vi r t ual l y 
com plete cross-secti on  of the wo r ki ng popul ati on i n Br i t ain.   Ou t   of  t hese 3, 200 f i r ms ,   M anagem ent  
Qu e s t i onnai r es we r e com pleted vi a f ace-to-face i nt ervi ew s wi t h  2, 191  m anagers yi eldi ng  a r esponse 
r ate of  approxi ma t ely  80% .
18
Me t hodol ogy
Ou r   esti ma t i ng  equat i on  i s specif i ed as f ol l ows:
i i i i u Z W m + + = b a ( 26)
wh e r e N i , . . . , 1 =   denot es t he f i r m  specif i c subscri pt   and N  denot es t he  t ot al  num ber  of  f i r ms   i n  t he 
cross-secti on. i m  r epresents   t he ‘ m oni t ori ng i nt ensi t y’  of  f i r m i   wh i l s t   i W  and  i Z  r epresent  vectors 
of  com pensati on  and  f i r m  envi r onm ent   characteri sti cs r especti vel y.
Fol l ow i ng Leonard ( 1987),   Go r don ( 1990,   1994)  and N eal  ( 1993),   we   proxy m oni t ori ng 
i nt ensi t yv i a t he rati o of supervi sory t o non-supervi sory em pl oyees.  Supervi sors, wh i ch incl ude 
f orem en and l i ne m anagers,  are defi ned i n t he WE R S   as ‘ t hose peopl e di r ectl y concerned wi t h t he 
det ail ed supervi sion of  wo r k. ’   The  specif i c quest i on asked i n t he ‘ M anagem ent   Qu e s t i onnai r e’  of 
t he W ERS i s  as fol l ow s ‘ what   proport i on of   non-m anageri al   em ployees here have j ob dut i es 
t hat   i nvol ve supervi sing  ot her  em ployees?’  M anagers we r e asked  t o  i ndi cate i n  wh i ch r ange  t hei r  
f i r m  l ay – 0% ,   1 – 19% ,   20 – 39% ,   40 – 59% ,   60 – 79% ,   60 – 79%  or  80 t o 99% .   Fr om  t hi s 
i nforma t i on,   we   const r uct ed a 7-poi nt   supervi sion i ndex wh e r e 6 ( 0)  r epresents t he hi ghest   ( l ow est )  
proport i on  of  supervi sors.  I n  order  t o  esti ma t e equati on  ( 26),   a we i ght ed ordered probi t   mo d e l   wa s ,  
t herefore, specif i ed. The dat a  wa s  we i ght ed to com pensate for  the fact that  fi r m s had di f f erent 
probabi l i t i es of  bei ng  selected f or  t he  survey.
19
18 The m anagem ent   r espondent   wa s   defi ned as ‘ t he senior  m anager  deali ng wi t h personnel ,   staff   or  em ployee 
r elati ons’  at  t he  establi shm ent.
19 The pr obabi l i t y of selecti on w as det ermi ned by t hree factors (i )  the St andard Indust r i al classif i cati on m aj or 
group  and  t he  size band  assigned  by  t he  Inter- De p a r t me n t al  Bus i ness Re gi ster  ( I DBR)   ma i nt ained  by  t he  Of f i ce 
f or  Na t i onal   St ati sti cs  ( i i )   wh e t her  t he  establi shm ent  on  t he  I DBR  accords  wi t h  t he  defi ni t i on  of  an  establi shm ent 
on t he W ERS and (i i i )  the probabi l i t y t hat  the est abli shm ent w as selected for the previous W ERS as t hese 
establi shm ents wh e r e  possibl e  we r e  excluded  f r om   t he  1998  WE R S .17
Dr ago and Perl ma n  ( 1989) support  t he use of supervi sion as a proxy for m oni t ori ng,  
alt hough t hey acknow l edge t hat   supervi sion ma y   occur  f or  non-m oni t ori ng purposes - f or  exam ple,
t o co-ordi nat e product i on.   I ndeed,  m oni t ori ng  ma y   not   entail   di r ect  supervi sion  but   ma y   i nst ead r ely 
on factors such as output  m easurem ent and pi ece rates. Mo r e probl em ati c, t he num ber of
s upervi s ors  mi ght  be hi gh because m oni t ori ng i s  di f f i cult  [Al l gul i n and El l i ngsen (1998)]  or that  
supervi sors onl y spend a fr acti on of wo r k t i me  mo n i t ori ng [Re bi t zer ( 1995)] .  De s p i t e these
probl em s,  t he r elati ve pauci t y of  dat a com pels us – l i ke so m any ot her  r esearchers - t o r ely on t he 
proxy  defi ned  above.
20
We  i ncorporate a num ber of vari ables int o our analysi s to cont r ol  for com pensati on and 
envi r onm ent al f actors  wi t hi n t he fi r m.  Ful l  vari able defi ni t i ons and su mma r y st ati s t i cs f or t he
expl anatory vari ables are det ail ed i n Tabl es I   and I I   i n t he A ppendi x.   Wa g e s   clearl y  pl ay a key  r ol e 
i n our  analysi s.    I t   i s apparent,   how ever,   t hat   a pot enti al  i ssue of  endogenei t y ma y   exist  wi t h r espect 
t o wa g e s   and,   hence,   i n t he em pir i cal  specif i cati ons t hat   f ol l ow  we   i nst r um ent   f or  our  wa g e   proxy 
vari able.
21
I n part i cular,   and gi ven our  obj ecti ve of  i nvest i gat i ng t he r elati onshi p bet w een supervi sion,  
pay  and  em ployee shari ng,   we   i ncl ude  t hree vari ables r epresenti ng  t he  proport i on  of  non-m anageri al
em ployees part i cipat i ng i n profi t  shari ng,  em ployee share ow nership or perf orm ance r elated pay 
schem es.  I t   i s apparent  f r om   Tabl e I I   t hat   t he  average r ate of  supervi sion  i s r elati vel y  l ow er  am ongst  
‘ shari ng’  f i r ms   ( i . e.  t hose  operati ng  profi t   shari ng,   em ployee share ow nership  or  perf orm ance r elated 
pay schem es).  It  i s m isleading,  how ever,  to read too m uch i nt o t hi s since there are signi f i cant 
di f f erences across t he t wo   t ypes of  f i r ms   t hat   ma y   t hem sel ves be corr elated wi t h em ployee shari ng 
and/ or  supervi sion.   To  cont r ol   f or  such f actors we   t urn  t o  our  econom et r i c analysi s.
V. Re s ul t s
20 O ne excepti on i s K ruse (1992) w ho proxi es m oni t ori ng by an em pl oyee report ed m easure of how  oft en the 
supervi sor  checks  hi s/her  wo r k.
21 Ov e r - i dent i f yi ng i nst r um ent s for t he w age equat i on i ncl ude i ndust r y dum m y vari ables as w ell  as the
proport i on of m anagers, senior adm ini str ati ve and professional  staff ,  the proport i on of techni cal staff ,  the 
proport i on of cleri cal and secretari al staff ,  t he proport i on of craft  and ski l l ed servi ce staff ,  the proport i on of 
prot ecti ve  and  personal   service  staff,  t he  proport i on  of  sales  staff and  t he  proport i on  of  operat i ve,   assem bly  and 
r out i ne  unski l l ed  staff .18
Ou r  o r dered probi t  r esult s are set out  i n Tabl es II I  and IV f ol l ow i ng.  We  e s t i ma t ed three
specif i cati ons f ocusi ng on t he r elati onshi p bet w een supervi sion and wa g e s ,   supervi sion and ‘ shari ng’ 
and supervi sion and t he i nt eracti on bet w een w ages and ‘shari ng’.  I n general,  our result s are 
r easonabl y robust  across all  three specif i cati ons.  In al l  three specif i cati ons,  we  f i nd evi dence of a 
hi ghl y si gni f i cant i nverse relati onshi p bet w een w ages and supervi sion as predicted by t he
i nst r um ent al eff i ciency w age m odel .  The m agni t ude of t hi s  eff ect i s  especiall y hei ght ened in
specif i cati on ( i )   wh e r e t he vari ables r elati ng t o shari ng schem es are om i t t ed.  I n Specif i cati on ( i i )   we  
augm ent  our basi c m odel  wi t h vari ables denot i ng t he ext ent of profi t  shari ng,  em pl oyee share 
ow nership and perf orm ance r elated pay.   I t   i s apparent  t hat   t he extent  of  part i cipat i on i n em ployee 
share ow nership and perf orm ance related pay schem es,  in accordance w i t h our theoreti cal pri ors 
deri ved fr om  t he i nst r um ent al eff i ciency w age m odel ,  appears to be st r ongl y i nversely r elated t o 
supervi sion.   I t   i s surpri sing  t o  not e,  how ever,   t hat   t he  extent  of  part i cipat i on  i n  profi t   shari ng  schem es 
i s   i nsi gni f i cantl y  r elated t o  s upervi s i on.
I n specif i cati on (i i ) ,  we  i ncl ude t hree vari ables that  capture the i nt eracti on bet w een wa g e s  
and t he extent  of  part i cipat i on i n profi t   shari ng,   em ployee share ow nership and perf orm ance r elated 
pay.  To be specif i c, our aim i s to expl ore the predicti on encapsulated by Equat i on (25) of a 
hei ght ened tr ade-off   bet w een r em unerati on and m oni t ori ng i n ‘ s hari ng’  f i r ms .   Ou r   em pir i cal  r esul t s  
accord wi t h t he i nst r um ent ali st  m odel   i n t he case of  perf orm ance r elated pay and em ployee share 
ow nership  but   t hi s i s not ,   how ever,   t he  case f or  profi t   shari ng.
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Tabl e V I presents the m argi nal  eff ects of changes in sel ected regressors for the seven 
probabi l i t i es pert aini ng t o each l evel  of  t he supervi sion i ndex.   I n specif i cati on ( i i ) ,   i t   i s apparent  t hat  
f or  val ues  of  t he  supervi sion  i ndex  r angi ng  f r om   2  t o  6,   i n  accordance  wi t h  our  t heoreti cal  pri ors,  t he
ma r gi nal   eff ects are negat i ve f or  t he f our  expl anatory vari ables - % PS,   % ESOP,   %P RP   and  wa g e s .  
The  ma r gi nal   eff ects are l argest   f or  t he ESOP  vari able i ndi cati ng t hat   em ployee i nvol vem ent   i n t he 
f i r m ma y  b e  mo r e im port ant in eff ort  eli cit ati on t hat  rem unerati on per se.  Thi s overall   pat t ern i s 
22 The ethereal nat ure of the gi f t  exchange approach hi nders econom et r i c i nt erpretati on.   Ou r   r esult s,  how ever,  
ma y   be  i nt erpreted as suggest i ng  t hat   t he  ma r gi nal   ut i l i t y  of  a gi f t   of  hi gher  wa g e s   i s i ncreased wi t hi n    ‘ shari ng’ 
f i r ms–   wo r kers i n  t hese  f i r ms   ma y   be  r espondi ng  t o  t he  hi gher  wa g e s   by  r equi r i ng  l ess m oni t ori ng.19
r epeated i n specif i cati ons ( i )   and ( i i i )   wi t h t he excepti on of  t he i nt eracti ve t erm  bet w een % PS and 
wa g e s .   As   not ed above,   how ever,   t he  esti ma t ed coeff i cient  on  t hi s t erm  i s stati sti call y  i nsi gni f i cant.
Ot her  r esult s,  wh i ch accord wi t h eff i ciency wa g e   consi derati ons,   i ncl ude t he f ol l ow i ng.   I n all  
t hree specif i cati ons  m oni t ori ng  i s i nversely  associated wi t h  di sm issals and  r edundanci es yet   posi t i vel y 
associated wi t h t he extent  of  new  r ecrui t me n t .   Fi r ms   experi encing di f f i cult i es  f i l l i ng  vacancies  appear 
t o m oni t or  mo r e – t hese f i r ms   ma y   have a str ong i ncenti ve t o encourage t hei r   curr ent  wo r k f orce t o 
‘ wo r k’  r ather  t han ‘ shir k’.   The  extent  of  supervi sion i s also posi t i vel y associated wi t h t he am ount   of 
di screti on t hat  em ployees harbour over thei r  wo r k.  Fi xed t erm  cont r act em ploym ent  is inversely 
associated wi t h  t he  extent  of  supervi sion.   I t   mi ght   be  t he  case t hat   concerns  r egardi ng  t he  r enew al  of 
such cont r acts are suff i cient  t o  spur  i ndi vi dual   perf orm ance. 
We   also i ncorporate em ploym ent   as  a proxy f or  f i r m  s i ze,  di f f erences  i n wh i ch ma y   i nduce 
di f f erences i n m oni t ori ng wi t h t urnover  and adverse selecti on costs encouraging l arger  f i r ms   t o pay 
hi gher wa g e s  [ Br unel l o (1995),  Kr use (1992),  Bul ow  and Sum m ers (1986)] .  Sur pri singl y,   t he 
esti ma t ed coeff i cient on em pl oym ent  i s insi gni f i cant and hence does not  l end support  t o t he
hypot hesi s that  l arge fi r m s devot e m ore resources to m oni t ori ng.  Fi nal l y,  off -the-j ob t r aini ng i s  
posi t i vel y ass oci ated w it h supervi s i on suggest i ng t hat  fi r ms  invest i ng heavi l y i n t r aini ng are m ore 
i ncl i ned  t o  m oni t or  perhaps  i n  order  t o  ensure r eturns  f r om   t he  expansi on  of  hum an  capit al.
VI . Fi nal   Co mme n t s
I nst r um ent al  eff i ciency wa g e   m odel s predict  an i nverse r elati onshi p bet w een wa g e s   and supervi sion 
wi t h t hi s relati onshi p becom i ng m ore pronounced am ongst  fi r ms  t hat  part i cipat e in som e form o f  
em ployee shari ng.  To be s ur e, our t heoreti cal exposi t i on predicts that  an increase in t ot al
r em unerati on  wi l l   eli cit   a l arger  cut  i n  opt i ma l   m oni t ori ng  i n  ‘ s hari ng’  r ather  t han  ‘ non  s hari ng’  f i r ms .
I n t hi s paper,  w e have expl ored these predicti ons em pi r i call y usi ng t he Bri t i sh 1998 
Wo r kpl ace Em ployee R elati ons Survey.  Ou r  r esult s confi r m a n  i nverse relati onshi p bet w een
supervi sion and pay but   t he t r ade-off   i s   onl y hei ghtened by  t he  presence of  perf orm ance r elated pay 
and em pl oyee share ow nership schem es.  We  a l so fi nd t hat  em ployee share ow nership and
perf orm ance r elated pay are r elati vel y mo r e successful   i n all eviati ng t he need t o m oni t or,   wi t h t he 
r ate of  profi t   shari ng  i m pacti ng  i nsi gni f i cantl y  on  t he  l evel  s upervi s i on.20
Som e  cauti on i s,  how ever,   wa r r anted.  Al t hough i nt r ospect i on w oul d suggest   ot herwi se,  we  
are unabl e to di sm iss the possi bi l i t y t hat  i t  i s supervi sion,  or som e other factor,  wh i ch dri ves 
em ployee shari ng.   I t   ma y   be t he case,  f or  exam ple,  t hat   f i r ms   operati ng em ployee share ow nership 
pl ans are able t o econom i se on m oni t ori ng because t hey are r elati vel y mo r e r ecepti ve t o t he needs 
and desi r es of t hei r  em ployees, w ho t hem sel ves respond posi t i vel y t o t hi s ethos,  wi t h t he
i mp l em entati on  of  t he  em ployee share ow nership  pl an bei ng  but   one  of  m any  such by-product s.A1
Appendi x
Tabl e I :   Var i abl e Li st  and  De f i ni t i ons
Var i abl eD e f i ni t i on
Supervi se %    of   non-m anageri al   em ployees who  are  supervi sors
W age  Pr oxy I ndex denot i ng operat i ng costs account ed f or by wages,   salari es and ot her l abour costs such as 
pensi ons  and  nat i onal   i nsurance  as  a  proport i on  of   sales revenue
23
%  PS %   of   non-m anageri al   em ployees who  received prof i t   relat ed pay  i n  t he  past   12  m ont hs
%  ESOP %   of   non-m anageri al   em ployees part i cipat i ng  i n  em ployee share  ownershi p  schem e
%  PRP %   of   non-m anageri al   em ployees who  received perf orm ance  relat ed pay  i n  t he  past   12  m ont hs
Di sm issal  D ecisio n Du mmy  Va r i abl e =  1 if  supervi sors have the f i nal  decision about  di sm issing w orkers for 
unsat i sfact ory  perf orm ance
Trai ned  Supervi sors %  of   supervi sors who  have been t rained  i n  ‘ peopl e m anagem ent ’   skil l s
24
Of f - t he-j ob  Trai ni ng %   of   em ployees who  have received f orm al   ‘ of f - t he-j ob’  t raini ng  over t he  past   12  m ont hs
Trai ni ng  D ays Average num ber  of   days  per  em ployee received i n  ‘ of f - t he-j ob’  t raini ng  over t he  past   12  m ont hs
Vacancy Di f f i cult i e s Du mmy  v a r i abl e =  1 if  fi rm  has had di f f i cult y fi l l i ng non-m anageri al ,   senior adm i ni strati ve or 
non-prof essional   vacancies i n  t he  l ast   12  m ont hs
Di screti on Index denot i ng  how  mu c h   di screti on  em ployees have over t hei r wor k
Pace I ndex denot i ng  how  mu c h   cont rol  em ployees have over t he  pace of   t hei r wor k
Pi ece Rat e s Du mmy   variabl e =  1  i f   i ndi vidual   perf orm ance  or  out put   i s m easured  by  pi ece rates
Fi xed Term  Cont racts%   of   em ployees em ployed on  f i xed t erm  cont racts
Femal e%   of   f em ale em ployees
Par t - Ti me %  of   part - t i me   em ployees ( i . e.  em ployees wor k i ng  f ew er t han  30  hours  per  w eek)
Di sm issals Num ber  of   di sm issals over t he  past   12  mo n t hs
Redundanci es N um ber of   redundanci es over t he  past   12  m ont hs
Ne w  Ent rant s Num ber  of   peopl e start i ng  wor k   over t he  past   12  m ont hs
Young %   of   em ployees aged  l ess t han  20
Ol d%   of   em ployees over age  of   50
Et hni cit y%   of   em ployees f rom  non-whi t e ethni c background
Trade  Un i on  M em bers Num ber  of   t rade  uni on  me mb e r s   /   num ber  of   em ployees
Fi rm  Si ze N um ber of   em ployees
23 The ‘ Empl oyee Q uesti onnai r e’ represents an alt ernat i ve source of w age dat a. For  thi s survey,  a sam ple of 
em ployees,  r andom l y  selected f r om   all   em ployees,  wa s   asked  t o  i ndi cate i n  wh i ch band  t hei r   wa g e   or  salary  l ay. 
A  ma x i mu m  of  25 em ployees we r e selected f r om  each f i r m.   Gi ven t hat   i n very l arge f i r ms   such a sam ple size i s 
som ew hat  sm all   and ma y   not ,   t herefore,  be r epresentati ve of  t he wo r kpl ace as a w hol e,  we   decided t o use t he 
alt ernat i ve  source  of  wa g e   i nforma t i on  presented  i n  t he  ‘ M anagem ent   Qu e s t i onnai r e’.
24  Exampl es of  ‘ peopl e m anagem ent ’   skil l s i ncl ude  l eadership,   t eam  bui l di ng,   mo t i vat i on  and  co-operati on  skil l s; 
com m uni cati on  skil l s;  counsel l i ng;   handl i ng  di scipl i ne  and  gri evance ma t t ers;  i nt ervi ew ing  t echni ques;   eff ecti ve 
j ob  organi sati on;   probl em   analysi s and  decision  ma k i ng.A2
Tabl e I I :D escript i ve St at i sti cs
Al l   Fi rm s
(n =  2191)
Shari ng  Fi rm s
(n =  985)
Non- Shari ng  Fi rm s
(n =  1233)
Var i abl e Me a n S .   De v Mi nM a x M e a n S .   De v Me a n S .   De v
W age  Pr oxy 2. 26 1. 28 0. 00 4. 00 1. 90 1. 17 2. 54 1. 29
%  PS 0. 26 0. 42 0. 00 1. 00 0. 58 0. 45 - -
%  ESOP 0. 11 0. 27 0. 00 1. 00 0. 25 0. 36 - -
%  PRP 0. 13 0. 32 0. 00 1. 00 0. 31 0. 42 - -
Supervi se 1. 64 1. 25 0. 00 6. 00 1. 55 1. 20 1. 71 1. 28
Di sm issal  D ecision 0. 08 0. 27 0. 00 1. 00 0. 08 0. 27 0. 07 0. 26
Trai ned  Supervi sors 0. 40 0. 39 0. 00 1. 00 0. 47 0. 40 0. 36 0. 38
Of f - t he- j ob  Trai ni ng 0. 48 0. 37 0. 00 1. 00 0. 50 0. 36 0. 46 0. 38
Trai ni ng  Da y s 3. 24 2. 84 0. 00 10. 00 3. 40 2. 84 3. 11 2. 83
Vacancy  Di f f i cult i es 0. 43 0. 50 0. 00 1. 00 0. 47 0. 50 0. 39 0. 49
Di screti on 1. 80 0. 87 0. 00 3. 00 1. 72 0. 85 1. 86 0. 88
Pace 1. 70 0. 89 0. 00 3. 00 1. 68 0. 88 1. 71 0. 90
Pi ece  Rat es 0. 01 0. 11 0. 00 1. 00 0. 03 0. 16 0. 00 0. 03
Fi xed  Term  Cont racts 0. 04 0. 09 0. 00 0. 50 0. 03 0. 07 0. 05 0. 10
Femal e 0. 49 0. 29 0. 00 1. 00 0. 42 0. 26 0. 55 0. 29
Par t - Ti me 0. 26 0. 28 0. 00 1. 00 0. 20 0. 26 0. 30 0. 29
Di sm issals 2. 29 6. 94 0. 00 162. 00 3. 02 9. 01 1. 72 4. 67
Redundanci es 4. 72 27. 60 0. 00 835. 00 6. 59 36. 18 3. 27 18. 23
Ne w  Ent rant s 43. 66 112. 37 0. 00 2665. 00 53. 23 131. 61 36. 22 94. 14
Young 0. 06 0. 11 0. 00 0. 89. 00 0. 07 0. 11 0. 06 0. 11
Ol d 0. 15 0. 12 0. 00 0. 86. 00 0. 13 0. 10 0. 16 0. 12
Et hni cit y 0. 05 0. 10 0. 00 0. 89. 00 0. 05 0. 10 0. 05 0. 10
Trade.  Un i on
Me mb e r s
0. 31 0. 35 0. 00 1. 00 0. 31 0. 35 0. 31 0. 34
Fi rm  Si ze 288. 74 847. 31 10. 00 28971. 00 300. 47 449. 83 279. 63 1057. 75A3
Tabl e I I I :   Al l   Fi rm s
D ependent   Var i abl e:  SUPERVI SE  -   We i ght ed  O rdered  Probi t   M odel
Specif i cati on  (i) Specif i cati on  (ii ) Specif i cati on  (ii i )
Var i abl e Coe f fT   St at Coef fT   St at Coef fT   St at
W age  Pr oxy - 0. 0713 -10. 691 -0. 0430 -6. 254 -0. 0470 -6. 767
%  PS - - - 0. 0215 -1. 001 - -
%  ESOP - - - 0. 3167 -5. 502 - -
%  PRP - - - 0. 2954 -10. 777 - -
%  PS*W age - - - - 0. 0116 1. 697
%  ESOP  W a g e ---- - 0. 0981 -4. 763
%  PRP*W age - - - - - 0. 0629 -7. 242
Di sm issal  D ecision 0. 5357 15. 570 0. 5146 14. 895 0. 5213 15. 092
Trai ned  Supervi sors 0. 7625 35. 847 0. 8003 36. 036 0. 7884 35. 380
Of f - t he-j ob  Trai ni ng 0. 1120 6. 371 0. 1520 8. 277 0. 1465 7. 738
Trai ni ng  Da y s 0. 0006 0. 278 -0. 0008 -0. 340 -0. 0009 -0. 040
Vacancy Di f f i cult i es 0. 2739 20. 794 0. 2581 9. 192 0. 2617 19. 404
Di screti on 0. 0170 2. 180 0. 0221 2. 814 0. 2081 2. 663
Pace - 0. 0333 -4. 228 -0. 0357 -4. 534 -0. 0336 -4. 276
Fi xed Term  Cont racts - 0. 2391 -3. 300 -0. 2795 -3. 872 -0. 2556 -3. 528
Pi ece Rat es - 0. 2175 -1. 069 -0. 1635 -0. 567 -0. 1846 -0. 651
Femal e 0. 0928 4. 014 0. 0953 4. 100 0. 1044 4. 488
Par t - Ti me - 0. 2025 -8. 965 -0. 2330 -10. 146 -0. 2159 -9. 348
Log  Di sm issals - 0. 1615 -10. 199 -0. 1751 -11. 083 -0. 1712 -10. 735
Log  Redundanci es - 0. 0594 -2. 585 -0. 0639 -2. 830 -0. 0637 -2. 789
Log  Ne w  Ent rant s 0. 1065 13. 270 0. 1081 13. 208 0. 1086 13. 260
Young 0. 3110 7. 127 0. 2829 6. 400 0. 2935 6. 660
Ol d 0. 2203 4. 748 0. 1391 2. 960 0. 1911 4. 082
Et hni ci t y 0. 0135 0. 291 0. 1021 2. 033 0. 0727 1. 463
Trade  Un i on  Me mb e r s - 0. 0095 -0. 394 0. 0197 0. 789 0. 0063 0. 255
Log  Fi rm  Si ze - 0. 0228 -1. 310 -0. 0053 -0. 301 -0. 0116 -0. 665
Const ant 0. 7974 14. 146 0. 7106 12. 423 0. 7023 12. 437
Log  Li keli hood  Funct i on - 3043. 173 -3033. 148 -3036. 996
Res t ricted Log  Li keli hood - 3157. 561 -3157. 561 -3157. 561
Chi - Squared  St at i sti c 228. 7757 20  d. f. 248. 8255 23  d. f . 241. 1304 23  d. f.
Numbe r   of   O bservati ons 2191 2191 2191A4
Tabl e I V:   Al l   Fi rm s
D ependent   Var i abl e:  SUPERVI SE  -   We i ght ed  O rdered  Probi t   M odel   ( Ma r g i nal   Ef f ects)
Supervi sion  Index
Var i abl e 0123456
Specif i cati on  (i)
W age 0. 0166 0. 0101 -0. 0117 -0. 0061 -0. 0036 -0. 0018 -0. 0035
Specif i cati on  (ii )
%  PS 0. 0050 0. 0031 -0. 0036 -0. 0018 -0. 0011 -0. 0005 -0. 0010
%  ESOP 0. 0732 0. 0453 -0. 0526 -0. 0269 -0. 0157 -0. 0080 -0. 0152
%  PRP 0. 0683 0. 0422 -0. 0491 -0. 0251 -0. 0147 -0. 0074 -0. 0142
W age 0. 0099 0. 0061 -0. 0071 -0. 0037 -0. 0021 -0. 0011 -0. 0021
Specif i cati on  (ii i )
%  PS*W age - 0. 0027 -0. 0017 0. 0019 0. 0010 0. 0006 0. 0003 0. 0006
%  ESO P*W age 0. 0227 0. 0140 -0. 0162 -0. 0084 -0. 0049 -0. 0025 -0. 0047
%  PRP*W age 0. 0146 0. 0090 -0. 0104 -0. 0054 -0. 0031 -0. 0016 -0. 0030
W age 0. 0109 0. 0067 -0. 0078 -0. 0040 -0. 0023 -0. 0012 -0. 0023A5
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